SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

S.C. 19832 S.C. 19833

DONNA L. SOTO, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA L. SOTO, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

٧.

BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, A/K/A, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CONNECTICUT CITIZENS' DEFENSE LEAGUE, INC.

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether a business may be held liable, under Connecticut tort law or the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, for lawfully distributing and selling a type of firearm that is both functionally safer and empirically less likely to be used in mass shootings or other violent crime than an ordinary handgun or hunting rifle.

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE¹

Amicus Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. ("CCDL") is a non-partisan grass-roots organization that works to promote Second Amendment rights through legislative action, to keep its members informed about legal requirements and potential legislative and regulatory developments related to the right to keep and bear arms, and to educate the public about these legal developments and about the importance of safeguarding the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens. Founded in 2009, CCDL has over 27,000 members throughout the State of Connecticut. It has a strong interest in the outcome of this case because imposing liability on the Defendants for manufacturing, distributing, and selling the AR-15—to law-abiding, adult citizens and in compliance with all federal and state laws and regulatory requirements—would set a precedent that could lead to a dramatic reduction in the availability in Connecticut of all firearms that, like the AR-15, are commonly held by ordinary citizens for lawful purposes such as self-defense, hunting, and target shooting.

¹ Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-7, amicus certifies that no counsel for any party wrote any part of this brief, no counsel or party contributed to the cost of the preparation or submission of this brief, and no one other than the Connecticut Citizens' Defense League, its members, or its counsel made such a monetary contribution.

INTRODUCTION

When Defendant Riverview Sales sold an AR-15 rifle to Nancy Lanza in 2010, it sold her a firearm that, by every empirical measure, was *less* dangerous and *less* likely to be used in a mass shooting than an ordinary hunting rifle or handgun. Because it fires .223-caliber bullets, for instance, the AR-15 has about *one-quarter* the firepower of a .30-06-caliber rifle—a traditional, popular choice for deer hunting. And studies show that common handguns are used in *over 20 times as many mass shootings* as the AR-15.²

The negligent entrustment and unfair trade practices claims brought by Plaintiffs in this action depend on a contrary factual narrative. The AR-15, by their telling, is a "supremely efficient mass killer[]" that, because of its "sheer destructive power," is "the weapon of choice for lone shooters looking to inflict maximum casualties" and is "used repeatedly, regularly, and routinely to mass kill Americans." This narrative is fiction. As demonstrated below, in reality the AR-15 is functionally indistinguishable from any other of the tens, if not hundreds, of millions of semi-automatic firearms that law-abiding Americans keep in the home for self-defense, shoot at the target range, and use when they go hunting. Far from "the weapon of choice" in mass shootings, according to available data the AR-15 is only used in about 3% of all mass shootings. And of the over two million AR-15s in the United States when Nancy Lanza purchased hers in 2010, 499.8% were not used *in any*

² Based on data from a prominent anti-gun group, AR-15s are used in only 3.2% of mass shootings, see *infra* note 38, while handguns are used in 64.7%, see *infra* note 45.

³ Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, 21, 23, 44, 45 (Mar. 1, 2017) ("Appellants' Br.").
⁴ Simon Rogers, Rob Grant, & Sean Anderson, *How many AR15 rifles have been sold in the US?*, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2012), *available at* https://goo.gl/3PBwDG.

kind of gun crime that year.⁵ If lawfully distributing and selling the AR-15⁶ gives rise to liability under Connecticut law, then so does the distribution and sale of any handgun or semi-automatic rifle—firearms that make up *nearly two-thirds* of domestic sales.⁷

Plaintiffs are asking this Court to embrace a novel legal theory that by its own logic necessarily amounts to a near-total ban on firearm sales. Because that result cannot be squared with our practices, our legal traditions, or our constitutional protections, Plaintiffs' theory must be rejected, and the decision of the Superior Court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. The semiautomatic firearms at issue in this case are no more dangerous, powerful, or destructive than any other firearm.

⁵ Statistics on the use of the AR-15 are difficult to find, because studies often refer generally to "assault weapons"—"a political term, developed by anti-gun publicists" to refer to various firearms that share certain largely cosmetic features. *Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 1001 n.16 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, *In Re 101 California Street*, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 41, 43 (1997)). As discussed below, well under 1% of gun crimes are committed using an "assault rifle" of any kind. *See infra* note 33. Even if one were to round up to 1% of the 422,550 violent crimes committed in 2010, assume that all of these involved the AR-15, and further assume that each such crime involved a *different* AR-15 (which they plainly did not, since many incidents involved multiple victims), that would mean that at most 0.21% of the estimated 2 million AR-15s in the United States were used in a violent crime that year. *See* Michael Planty & Jennifer L. Truman, *Special Report: Firearm Violence*, 1993–2011 at 3 tbl.3, Bureau of Justice Statistics (May 2013), *available at* https://goo.gl/2MnMrV. Given the assumptions made in the calculation, even that small number is clearly an overestimate.

⁶ Plaintiffs briefly dispute whether Connecticut "determined" that the AR-15 purchased by Nancy Lanza "could be legally possessed," but they admit that the firearm "was not banned" when she purchased it. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9-10 (June 9, 2017). The inescapable implication of that concession is that it could be legally possessed, particularly against the backdrop of Connecticut laws banning *other* firearms. See DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 320 Conn. 178, 194 (2016) (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).

⁷ As shown below, handguns account for 47% of domestic firearms sales, *see infra* note 46, and semi-automatic rifles account for about 40% of rifle sales, *see infra* note 30. Together, these firearm types account for 63% of all domestic sales. *See* BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURING AND EXPORT REPORT 1 (2015), *available at* https://goo.gl/rECFMF (our tabulation based on raw data).

Plaintiffs contend that the AR-15 is "the perfect piece of military hardware," where "[e]very detail . . . serves the same end: to ensure that whoever wields it will achieve more wounds, of greater severity, in more victims, in less time, every time." Appellants' Br. at 2, 5. In reality, the AR-15 is simply an ordinary firearm, distinguished from any other common rifle solely by a set of largely-cosmetic features that, to the extent they have any functional effect at all, serve to make the firearm safer for civilian use.

Plaintiffs' amici, for instance, emphasize that the AR-15 has a pistol grip, which they say gives it "spray-firing power." But a pistol grip is simply a handgrip that extends below the firearm, which allows the user to comfortably grip it with the trigger hand when firing from the shoulder. That feature allows the rifle's user to more easily position the firearm in the pocket of her shoulder, which aids in firing the rifle accurately; and it also increases the user's ability to hold onto her firearm if someone is trying to pull it out of her hands. Both aspects make rifles with pistol grips attractive home-defense firearms; neither makes them more dangerous or apt to be criminally misused. And the notion that pistol grips facilitate "spray firing" from the hip is wrong twice over. First, because of the awkward way one's wrist would have to be twisted to hold a rifle with a pistol grip at hip-level, a firearm that does not have a pistol grip is actually more conducive to firing from the hip. And second, "shooting from the hip" is highly inaccurate and ineffective—hence the idiom—and for that

⁹ See David B. Kopel, *Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition*, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381, 396 (1994).

⁸ Brief of Amici Curiae CT Against Gun Violence & Tom Diaz at 1 (May 1, 2017) ("CT Against Gun Violence Amicus Br."); Brief for *Amici Curiae* Katie Bakes M.D., *et al.* in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3 (Apr. 21, 2017) ("Physicians' Amicus Br.").

¹⁰ Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1484 (2009).

¹¹ Stephen P. Halbrook, *New York's Not So "Safe" Act*, 78 ALB. L. REV. 789, 803 (2015).

reason a firearm designed to be foolishly fired in this way would in any event be less lethal in the hands of a determined murderer.¹²

Plaintiffs and their amici also point to the AR-15's muzzle velocity, which supposedly gives it the "power to tear the human body to pieces," and turn "organs into goo." He plaintiffs' amici suggest that because of the firearm's muzzle velocity its "bullets explode inside the body" like "grenade[s]." But simple physics refutes this hysteria. Far from having fantastical destructive power akin to the weapons from some science fiction film, the AR-15 is in reality significantly *less* powerful than many common hunting rifles. As one of Plaintiffs' amici explains, "[t] he energy of a bullet varies with its mass and velocity." While the AR-15's muzzle velocity is on the higher end, because the .223 ammunition it fires is significantly lighter than the bullets used in many other common firearms, it has significantly less power overall. For instance, the common .30-06 caliber rifle—used for scores of years by millions of Americans for hunting deer and other big game—fires a bullet three or four times heavier than the AR-15; as a result, typical rifles in this caliber have *three to four times the overall firepower* of an AR-15, even if their muzzle velocity is marginally lower.

Plaintiffs next posit that the AR-15 is especially dangerous because its purportedly

¹² ld.

¹³ Appellants' Br. at 5–6, 21.

¹⁴ Physicians' Amicus Br. at v.

¹⁵ Brief of Amici Curiae Newtown Action Alliance & Connecticut Ass'n of Public School Superintendents at 7 (May 1, 2017).

¹⁶ Physicians' Amicus Br. at 2.

¹⁷ CT Against Gun Violence Br. at 6.

¹⁸ Nicholas J. Johnson, *Supply Restrictions at the Margins of* Heller *and the Abortion Analogue*: Stenberg *Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique*, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1303–04 (2009) (AR-15's bullets have energy of 1282 foot-pounds at the muzzle and 296 foot-pounds at 400 yards, compared to several common .30-06 rifles, which have 3100 foot-pounds of energy at the muzzle and 1410 at 400 yards).

large-capacity magazines—which do not distinguish AR-15s from other semi-automatic firearms—"allow for prolonged assaults." 19 Wrong again. According to one scholar, because "[s]killed shooters can change detachable magazines in two seconds or less, and even relatively unskilled persons can, with minimal practice, do so in four seconds," using a higher capacity magazine "do[es] not increase the time needed to fire a given number of rounds by much."20 Later in their brief Appellants themselves make this point, noting that Adam Lanza "taped [several of his magazines] together to allow for faster reload"—a technique Defendants obviously could have done nothing to prevent.21 And in fact, most of Lanza's 30-round magazines were later recovered from the scene with ten or more rounds left inside. Consistent with these facts, the data indicate that the availability of largecapacity magazines is essentially irrelevant to the number of casualties in mass-shooting events: they are used in "less than 1/3 of 1% of mass shootings,"22 and in any event mass killers almost never "maintain[] a sustained rate of fire that could not also have been maintained—even taking reloading time into account—with either multiple guns or with an ordinary six-shot revolver and the common loading devices known as 'speedloaders.' "23

Finally, Plaintiffs and their amici suggest that the AR-15 is uniquely dangerous and lethal because its semiautomatic fire "unleashes a torrent of bullets in a matter of seconds." Indeed, they estimate that a semiautomatic firearm "can empty a 30-round"

¹⁹ Appellants' Br. at 5.

²¹ Appellants' Br. at 12.

²² Kleck, *supra* note 20, at 2.

²⁴ Appellants' Br. at 5.

Gary Kleck, Large-Capacity Magazines and the Casualty Counts in Mass Shootings: The Plausibility of Linkages 5–6 (Mar. 2, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/oovgkE.

²³ GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 125 (2006).

magazine in five to ten seconds."25 Yet again, this claim is highly misleading. According to the U.S. Army, the maximum effective rate of fire for the M16 in semi-automatic mode is between 45-65 rounds per minute—five to eight times slower than Plaintiffs claim.²⁶ Plaintiffs' own characterization of Lanza's rate of fire—154 bullets in five minutes, or a little over one shot every two seconds—supports the Army's assessment, not theirs.²⁷

The AR-15's actual rate of fire also shows why Plaintiffs are wrong to dismiss the obvious mechanical distinction between that commonly-owned firearm and the military's M-16: while the former fires only one shot per pull of the trigger, the M-16 is a fully-automatic "machine gun," capable of firing continuously with one trigger pull until the trigger is released or the magazine has been emptied. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 620 n.1 (1994). Contrary to Plaintiffs' flawed estimates, the U.S. Army's Field Manual confirms that the M-16's maximum effective rate of fire in fully automatic mode is three to four multiples higher than in semi-automatic mode. That is a major functional difference by any measure, and Plaintiffs' dismissal of the distinction in a footnote²⁸—and their amici's suggestion that the difference is "slight"29—simply cannot be credited. Indeed, the distinction between semiautomatic and automatic fire is one the U.S. Supreme Court has identified as marking the boundary between firearms that "traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions" and those that have not. Staples, 511 U.S. at 612. The fact that no modern military utilizes the AR-15, as opposed to its fully-automatic-capable

²⁵ *Id.* at 5 n.4.

²⁶ Department of the Army, Rife Marksmanship: M16-/M4-Series Weapons at 2-1 tbl.2-1 (Aug. 2008), *available at* https://goo.gl/yisKn9. ²⁷ Appellants' Br. at 12.

²⁸ Appellants' Br. at 5 n.4.

²⁹ Physicians' Amicus Br. at 2.

cousin, cements the importance of the distinction.

Even setting these points aside, the necessary implications of Plaintiffs' argument that the AR-15 is especially dangerous because it is semiautomatic prove that it cannot be right. For not only is the AR-15 semiautomatic: so are tens, if not hundreds, of millions of other common firearms owned by law-abiding Americans. Semi-automatic firearms are extraordinarily commonplace—they account for about 40% of the rifles sold in the United States, and about 80% of the handguns. Accordingly, if the AR-15 is especially dangerous because it is semiautomatic, then so are half or more of the Nation's total stock of firearms, from hunting rifles to handguns. Under Plaintiffs' theory of the case, that means that whenever a company distributes or sells a semiautomatic rifle or pistol, it becomes exposed to liability for negligent entrustment if that firearm is ultimately misused. 31

Plaintiffs thus seek to transform this State's negligent entrustment law into a *de facto* ban on the sale of most firearms. That is not the law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that possession of handguns for self-defense is constitutionally protected, *see District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008), and it cannot be illegal to *sell* to law-abiding citizens the very firearms that they have a constitutional right to *possess. See Teixeira v. County of Alameda*, 822 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016), *reh'g en banc granted*, 854 F.3d 1046; *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010); *Illinois Ass'n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago*, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (N.D. III. 2014).

II. Semiautomatic firearms like the AR-15 are used in many multiples fewer violent crimes, including mass shootings, than other commonly-owned firearms such as ordinary handguns.

NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW & THE SECOND AMENDMENT 8, 11 (2012).

Appellants' Br. at 15–26.

In addition to their failed claims that the AR-15's features give it an "unparalleled capacity to kill," Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants should be held liable because they were on notice, before distributing and selling the AR-15, that it "had become the weapon of choice for lone shooters looking to inflict maximum casualties," a context where it "reigns supreme." Once again, the available data squarely refutes Plaintiffs' narrative. AR-15s are almost never used in crime; criminals by an overwhelming margin prefer cheaper and more portable handguns. And far from being the "weapon of choice" in mass shooting events, only a *miniscule fraction* of mass shooters use the AR-15.

The AR-15 is virtually never used in crime. Numerous studies have investigated the percentage of violent crimes committed with so-called "assault rifles." The average estimate of these studies is that substantially fewer than 1% of violent crimes involve an assault rifle of any kind. For example, a recent analysis of about 40 studies of the issue concluded that "less than 2% of crime guns are 'assault weapons' . . . and well under 1% are 'assault rifles.' "33 In another assessment—a 2004 study sponsored by the Department of Justice in an effort to justify the now-defunct federal "assault weapon ban"—researchers attempting to defend the ban were forced to concede that "assault weapons" accounted only for "between 1% and 6% of guns used in crime according to . . . several national and local data sources," and that the vast majority of these—"by a ratio of 3 to 1"—were handguns, not rifles. The part of the semicondition of

³² *Id.* at 5–6, 8, 14.

³³ KLECK, supra note 23, at 112.

³⁴ CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN 15–16 (June 2004), https://goo.gl/iVZvt. Even if confined to rifles, these studies *still* overestimate the number of *AR-15s* used in crime, since they include *all* "assault rifles."

committed in the state involved a rifle of any kind, much less an AR-15 in particular.35

Even the mass shootings that Plaintiffs focus on involve the use of an AR-15 only a small fraction of the time. The 2004 Department of Justice study estimated that between 4% and 13% of mass shootings involved "assault weapons" of any kind. A 2015 report by the Congressional Research Service similarly concluded that "offenders used firearms that could be characterized as 'assault weapons' in . . . 9.78%" of mass shootings. Again, that number includes both "assault pistols" and "assault rifles" of any kind. When only AR-15s are counted, the percentage drops. For example, in the analysis of 156 mass shootings published by the anti-gun group Everytown for Gun Safety, only five—about three percent—involved an AR-model firearm. Plaintiffs' assertion that the AR-15 is the "weapon of choice" for mass shooters is thus demonstrably and palpably false.

Unsurprisingly, the federal government's abortive attempt to ban so-called "assault weapons" had no measurable effect on the incidence of mass shootings. Plaintiffs' amici suggest that "[m]ass shootings dropped while [the ban] was in effect" and "doubled" after it expired, 40 but that is not so. Data from the FBI demonstrates that over the last four decades, there have been on average approximately 20 mass shootings per year—with no

³⁵ According to the Uniform Crime Reports for each year between 2002 and 2011—each available for download at http://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx—there were 735 homicides committed with a firearm during that ten-year span, only 6 of which involved a rifle.

³⁶ KOPER, *supra* note 34, at 15.

³⁷ WILLIAM J. KROUSE & DANIEL J. RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., R44126, MASS MURDER WITH FIREARMS: INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS, 1999-2013 29, (2015), available at https://goo.gl/XuSffG.

³⁸ EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, MASS SHOOTINGS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009–2016, Appendix (2017), available at https://goo.gl/60LrxK (our tabulation based on raw data).

³⁹ Appellants' Br. at 8, 14.

⁴⁰ Physicians' Amicus Br. at 4.

discernable decrease when the federal ban was in effect and no discernable rise after its repeal.⁴¹ The "stud[y]" cited by Plaintiffs' amici for the contrary proposition is a blog post that reproduces the flawed Mother Jones database of public mass shootings⁴²—which has been repeatedly criticized by scholars for cherry-picking its data based on confusing and subjective "criteria that are hard to defend [and] . . . not necessarily applied consistently."

Plaintiffs' suggestion that the AR-15's misuse by Adam Lanza was "foreseeable" thus cannot be credited. Indeed, by every measure the misuse of any given AR-15 is far less likely—and thus far less foreseeable—than the misuse of an *ordinary handgun*. While AR-15s are used only in some fraction of 1% of violent crimes, *nearly 90% of such crimes involve handguns*. Similarly, while these firearms are used in only around 3% of mass shootings, *nearly 65%* involve handguns. On Plaintiffs' theory, then, companies are exposed to tort liability every time they distribute or sell an ordinary handgun—a class of arms that make up 47% of all sales, and the very type of firearm that *Heller* described as "the quintessential self-defense weapon" and held constitutionally protected. 554 U.S. at 629, 636. That conclusion simply cannot be right. Neither, then, can Plaintiffs' theory.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court should be affirmed.

⁴¹ James Alan Fox & Monica J. DeLateur, *Mass Shootings in America: Moving Beyond Newtown*, 18 HOMICIDE STUD. 127, 129 (2014), *available at* http://goo.gl/Ji7Yyp.

⁴² Physicians' Amicus Br. at 4 n.23. ⁴³ Fox & DeLateur, *supra* note 41, at 128–29; Kleck, *supra* note 20, at 12–13.

⁴⁴ Firearm Violence, supra note 5, at 3 tbl.3 (our tabulation based on 2011 data).

⁴⁵ EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, *supra* note 38 (our tabulation based on raw data).
⁴⁶ ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURING AND EXPORT REPORT, *supra* note 7 (our

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that (1) a copy of the foregoing has been mailed or delivered electronically on June 20, 2017 to each counsel of record and the trial judge as follows, in compliance with Practice Book § 62-7 and § 67-2; (2) the copy of the foregoing being filed with the appellate clerk is a true copy of the foregoing that was submitted electronically; (3) the foregoing has been redacted or does not contain any names or other personal identifying information that is prohibited from disclosure by rule, statute, court order or case law and (4) the foregoing complies with all applicable rules of appellate procedure.

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